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That poverty and illness often go hand in hand was hardly news at 
any time in the twentieth century. This relationship took on particular 
urgency during the Great Depression, when the United States suffered 
more than half of the total industrial decline occurring worldwide. Sick-
ness rates, like that of suicide, increased dramatically during the Depres-
sion; among families of the unemployed, the incidence of illness was 66 
percent greater than in those with one full-time worker. Without traditions 
of government responsibility and instruments of control for its citizens' 
welfare, America, of all the world's major countries, was the least pre-
pared to cope with the pervasive effects of global economic disaster. 
Health services for the poor, to the extent that they existed, remained the 
prerogative of state and local governments.1 
Even in the affluent twenties, amid the prosperity that preceded the 
crash, many Americans could not meet rising costs of medical, dental and 
hospital care. As a result both physicians and health care consumers 
began experimenting with prepayment plans, a form of risk-sharing in 
illness: the Blue Cross group hospitalization plan for school teachers in 
Dallas, Texas, started in 1929, as did Dr. Michael Shadid's hospital coop-
erative in Elk City, Oklahoma. "To study the economic aspects of the 
care and prevention of illness," forty-two representatives of medicine, 
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public health, the social sciences and the public at large constituted them-
selves as the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care (CCMC) in 1927. 
Chaired by Ray Lyman Wilbur, then Secretary of the Interior, and financed 
by eight major private foundations, the CCMC compiled overwhelming 
evidence, published in twenty-eight volumes between 1928 and 1932, that 
large numbers of Americans failed to receive adequate health care under 
the prevailing fee-for-service method of payment.2 
In a final volume issued in 1932, a majority of the CCMC agreed that 
health services in the United States suffered from chronic structural flaws. 
They recommended that health services be furnished by professionals— 
physicians, dentists, nurses, pharmacists and associated personnel—grouped 
into comprehensive community medical centers, organized regionally 
around hospitals and reimbursed by group payment through insurance, 
taxation, or both, with individual fee-for-service available to those who 
preferred it. Several physician-members of the CCMC dissented from this 
view. In counter-recommendations that explicitly stated organized medi-
cine's position on public policy for the first time since the Association 
formally condemned compulsory health insurance in 1920, the minority 
objected to group organization and to the use of insurance plans, unless 
sponsored and controlled by organized medicine.3 
Once, in the 1890s, when it was seeking the formation of a national 
health department, the American Medical Association had championed the 
health of the people as the first law of government.4 It now decried the 
majority report of the CCMC as an attempt "to socialize medical practice 
in this country." Morris Fishbein, ostensibly speaking for all American 
doctors in his position as the editor of Journal of the American Medical 
Association (JAMA), charged that the majority recommendations raised the 
question of "Americanism versus sovietism for the American people." He 
suggested that a shift to group practice would deprive the American citizen 
of the "right to pick his own doctor and his own hospital." Playing on 
physicians' fears of losing autonomy and on public ambivalence toward 
government regulation and intervention, Fishbein skillfully wielded rhetoric 
to mask distortions. Ignoring the fact that the CCMC included a number 
of physicians and that many practitioners were engaging in experiments 
with various forms of prepayment, the editor of the most widely read 
medical journal in the nation railed against the majority report with pur-
poseful illogic: "Let the big business man who would reorganize medical 
practice, the efficiency engineers who would make doctors the cogs of 
their governmental machines, give a little of their sixty horse power brains 
to a realization of the fact that Americans prefer to be human beings."5 
So it was that the most powerful journalistic voice in organized medi-
cine turned away from the high road at the very beginning of the Depres-
sion, setting a retrogressive course the nation is still trying to correct As 
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I. S. Falk, a participant in medical reform efforts extending over the inter-
vening half-century, summed it up: 
The leadership of America's 'organized medicine' had 
committed the profession to preservation of the inherited 
and then prevailing system of medical care, based on solo 
practice and fee-for-service payment, and to the continu-
ing professional domination and control of the system, 
deaf to appeals from other professional disciplines and 
from spokesmen for the consumers of medical care, and 
blind to the needs for better design of organization and 
for more adequate methods of payment.6 
Thus the battle lines stood shortly after Franklin Delano Roosevelt's 
election in 1932. On one side were those, including many physicians, who 
hoped to see health care redistributed according to medical need rather 
than ability to pay. On the other were the leaders of organized medicine, 
determined to maintain American practitioners in an autonomous position 
which they saw as threatened by the growth of specialization; by expand-
ing city, county and state health departments; by workman's compensation; 
by free and low-cost clinics; and by a growing number of successful group 
practices and medical cooperatives, estimated at 150 by 1930.7 
Organized medicine won a significant victory in 1935, when it forced 
the administration to delete from the Social Security Act even a bare 
reference to the need to study health insurance.8 The three surviving 
health related provisions of this landmark legislation were Title V, Part 1, 
establishing programs for maternal and child health and crippled children; 
Title V, Part 2, authorizing appropriations to assist the states in locating 
crippled children and providing them with hospital and medical services 
and after-care; and Title VI, authorizing public health grants-in-aid to the 
states and funds for intramural research in the Public Health Service. 
With only slight modifications these provisions furnished the framework 
for much of America's social welfare apparatus over the following dec-
ades.9 
Other New Deal measures also expanded the role of the federal gov-
ernment in health matters, if only temporarily. As early as June 1933 the 
Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) allowed its funds to be 
used for medical care and supplies, nursing, and emergency dental services 
(but not hospitalization, dental care or chronic illness). The Public Works 
Administration built hospitals, adding some 120,000 beds to the nation's 
total, while the Works Progress Administration pursued both construction 
and service programs related to health and sanitation. By the late thirties, 
when these two units were combined under the Federal Works Agency, 
they had produced veterans' hospitals, medical research stations, general 
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Defendants from headquarters office in Chicago: Morris Fishbein, 
Olin West, W. D. Cutter, R. G. Leland, and W. C. Woodward. 
As editor of JAMA and other AMA publications for more than 
twenty years beginning in 1924, Morris Fishbein led AMA opposition 
to group and prepaid medical practice and to national health planning. 
As AMA "field secretary" and "general manager" beginning in 1922, 
Olin West visited state and county medical societies across the nation, 
"to promote medical organization and medical economics"; the House 
of Delegates elected him AMA President in 1946. As Secretary of the 
AMA Council on Medical Education beginning in 1931, William D. 
Cutter, used the AMA's power to accredit hospitals for internship 
training to discipline institutions that admitted to their staffs physi-
cians who engaged in group practice or prepayment; Cutter resigned 
his AMA position while the antitrust case was under litigation. From 
1928 through World War II R. G. Leland served as director of the 
AMA's Bureau of Medical Economics. In 1922 W. C. Woodward 
became the first director of the AMA's Bureau of Legal Medicine and 
Legislation; he retired from this position in 1940, during the antitrust 
prosecution. 
Except for the photograph of Hugh Cabot, all illustrations in this 
article are reproduced from The United States of America, Appellants, 
vs. the American Medical Association, A Corporation; The Medical 
Society of the District of Columbia, A Corporation; The Harris County 
Medical Society, An Association, et al, Appellees (A reprint of the offi-
cial documents with a condensation of the trial) (American Medical 
Association, Chicago, 1941). Reprinted by permission of the American 
Medical Association. 
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hospitals, tuberculosis hospitals, mental hospitals, and homes for the aged 
and indigent; medical and dental schools; clinics; and dispensaries and 
research centers for educational institutions. They also contributed to non-
federal waterworks projects and sanitation efforts that reduced death rates 
from malaria and typhoid fever.10 
The Federal Works Agency furnished existing health agencies with 
doctors, dentists and nurses who maintained clinics and health centers for 
maternal and child health, the treatment of venereal disease and the pre-
vention of tuberculosis. The same agency furnished personnel who, under 
the auspices of the Public Health Service, conducted the National Health 
Survey, the most extensive inventory of health in America up to that time. 
Federal Works Agency professionals ran dental clinics that had treated 
more than three and a half million Americans by July 1938. Agency 
nurses provided almost a million immunizations as well as more than four 
and one half million home nursing visits to the ill and elderly.11 
Other New Deal innovations included a variety of health-related 
measures. The Civilian Conservation Corps taught attention to health and 
sanitation in its camps. Within the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) an 
administrative substructure established employee medical centers at various 
construction sites, while some TVA funds even went to improve local 
health services. The Civil Works Administration collaborated with the 
Public Health Service and the Federal Works Agency in efforts to control 
malaria, spotted fever and typhus.12 
The most direct federal intervention in personal health care—central to 
the subsequent development of national health planning—occurred under 
the seemingly unlikely agency of the Farm Security Administration (FSA). 
Government-subsidized medical care for some three million farm families 
was an incidental by-product of this program, which was initially intended 
only to make farm loans available to families hovering on the brink of 
disaster and unable to obtain credit from any other source. Early in the 
operation of this rural rescue operation (which was the only alternative to 
relief for nearly a quarter of the nation's farmers), it became clear that half 
or more of those who defaulted on repayment did so because they had had 
to sell livestock—chickens, hogs or calves—in order to pay medical bills. 
By early 1937 FSA administrators realized that the effectiveness of their 
rehabilitation efforts depended on getting medical aid to their borrowers.13 
Exploring ways to provide health care, along with feed, seed and 
tools, the FSA found that the best method was the grouping of families 
under a prepayment plan acceptable to local physicians on the basis of a 
uniform fee schedule geared to the low incomes of FSA borrowers. In a 
period when physicians in farm states often found themselves carrying 
thousands of dollars in uncollectable bills, many (but not all) state medical 
associations agreed to let their county societies participate in organizing 
FSA health plans. In 1939, despite organized medicine's longstanding and 
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otherwise unyielding opposition to prepayment and contract practice, the 
AMA effectively approved collaboration in FSA-subsidized medical plans 
by state and county medical societies.14 
Organized medicine (the AMA and its affiliated state and local socie-
ties) was less tolerant of co-operative medical plans or low-cost prepay-
ment experiments, whether organized by businesses or by physicians them-
selves. To combat what it perceived as dangerous deviations from ac-
cepted forms of practice, organized medicine used a variety of methods to 
obstruct the functioning of such ventures: expulsion from the local medical 
society (which often meant the loss of consulting rights as well as mal-
practice insurance); revocation of hospital privileges; suppression of reports 
indicating the inadequacy of prevailing forms of service and payment; and 
powerful propaganda, endlessly repeated, in its national organ, the Journal 
of the American Medical Association, as well as in state society journals. 
Morris Fishbein believed that it was JAMA's duty not only to reflect the 
opinions of physicians but also to "help to keep medical thinking in the 
right paths." To convince American doctors that compulsory health insur-
ance was a great evil, JAMA's editorship even practiced deliberate decep-
tion, presenting JAMA columns criticizing the British system as if a British 
practitioner had written them.15 
Some of these tactics were so outrageous that they inspired scholarly 
exposés. Oliver Garceau, a Harvard political scientist, wrote a masterful 
analysis, published in Public Opinion Quarterly in September 1940, under 
the title "Organized Medicine Enforces its 'Party Line."'16 When the 
New York State Journal of Medicine responded to Garceau's charges that 
organized medicine was using a combination of the medical press, group 
sanctions, expulsions, boycott and its politicians to mold medical opinion, 
its language sounded exactly like that of Morris Fishbein (who often fur-
nished ideas and prepared text for state journals). 
Mr. Garceau is an instructor in government at Harvard 
and, like a bloodhound, follows the spoor and scent of 
this sinister organization (medicine, not Harvard) unerr-
ingly through twenty pages of swampy reading matter, 
all set about with fever trees, to its lair on page 428. 
Here, panting, he finds 'the essence of the process (of 
moulding the opinion of the nation's doctors) is that 
familiar combination of the pen, the sword and the old-
fashioned politician.' 
With Fishbeinesque sarcasm, the commentator observed that Garceau's 
conclusions would surprise "a great number of very earnest and sincere 
men who have spent their lives, day and night, healing the sick, comfort-
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Drawn at the time of the grand jury indictment, this cartoon 
reflects the perception that the Roosevelt administration was using 
antitrust prosecution to force AMA acquiescence in a national health 
program. By reprinting it in 1941, alongside a Washington Evening 
Star caricature entitled "Can It Happen Here?" which showed Thur-
man Arnold jailing doctors in a cell next to the one where he had 
already locked up businessmen, the AMA implied that both groups 
were victims of a relentless federal drive for socialization. 
Reprinted by permission of the American Medical Association and 
the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette. 
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ing the dying, encouraging the well to stay well in spite of sickness 
insurance and other discouragements!"17 
Richard H. Shryock, a founder of the social history of American 
medicine, called his exposé "Freedom and Interference in Medicine" 
(Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Novem-
ber 1938). Although he opened by discussing historic movements that 
interfered with medical freedom from outside the profession (anti-dissec-
tion, antivivisection and anti-birth control; opposition to anesthesia in 
obstetrics; taboos on the discussion of venereal diseases), Shryock, like 
Garceau, was primarily concerned that leaders of organized medicine in the 
thirties were suppressing physician dissent over forms of service and pay-
ment.18 
In the middle of this growing public debate, President Roosevelt's 
Interdepartmental Committee to Coordinate Health and Welfare Activities 
(IC, directed by Assistant Secretary of Treasury, Josephine Roche) and its 
subsidiary Technical Committee on Medical Care (chaired by Martha M. 
Eliot of the Children's Bureau) struggled to prepare a national health plan 
that would find some degree of support from organized medicine. In the 
spring of 1939, a few months after the Interdepartmental Committee pre-
sented the President with a plan for the nation's first comprehensive health 
program, the Justice Department began an antitrust investigation implicat-
ing the AMA, several affiliated societies and twenty-one individual physi-
cians on charges of conspiring to coerce and restrain physicians and 
hospitals from engaging in group prepayment. 
Before the end of December 1938, a grand jury brought indictments 
against all of these representatives of organized medicine. In January 
1943, after more than four years of bitter litigation, the Supreme Court 
affirmed a judgment of guilty against the AMA and the District of Colum-
bia Medical Society, requiring the two to pay fines of $2500 and $1500 
respectively. Among many ironies of this first antitrust case against 
organized medicine were the fines, bare token payments compared to the 
more than half million dollars which the AMA estimated it had spent in 
legal costs. Another irony was that all individual defendants were exon-
erated in a judgment which rested on proven charges of conspiracy. 
A final irony is the prolonged debate, continuing to the present, about 
the real purpose of this, the first antitrust action against organized medi-
cine. Some contemporaries viewed it as a tactic in New Deal health 
reform strategy. According to the Washington Post of December 25, 1938, 
"A convincing case can be built up to support the theory that the extraor-
dinary grand jury study was, to put it bluntly, propaganda looking forward 
to Congressional consideration of the proposed National Health Program."19 
Many recent commentators, on the other hand, have downplayed this inter-
pretation. Close attention to the sequence of events between 1937 and 
1939 suggests that those nearest the scene may have been right.20 
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While the administration was studying the nation's health needs and 
possible ways to meet them without incurring the wrath of organized 
medicine, Esther Everett Lape, the incisive Member-in-Charge of the 
American Foundation, was grooming a small group of progressive physi-
cians to act as the spearhead of change in the forthcoming struggle for a 
national health program. She had selected her group, later called the 
Committee of Physicians for the Improvement of Medical Care, out of the 
Advisory Committee for her massive two-volume survey of medical 
opinion, American Medicine: Expert Testimony Out of Court, published in 
1937. Lape's chosen doctors were mostly academicians, all AMA mem-
bers in good standing, all persons of broad social awareness who felt 
disgruntled with the Association's obstruction of experiments with prepay-
ment and group practice. Having worked together on American Medicine, 
this little band of thirteen had continued to meet under Lape's able tute-
lage, discussing the problems then occupying the President's Interdepart-
mental Committee. Although few if any of this "inner circle" realized it, 
Lape, long a close friend of Eleanor Roosevelt, was grooming them to 
make a personal presentation of the views of American medicine's pro-
gressive wing to the President of the United States.21 
In April 1937, when Lape's American Medicine rolled off the presses, 
it gave the lie to Morris Fishbein's claim that American physicians had 
opposed the CCMC report "well-nigh unanimously." Lape's abundance of 
first-person physician-opinion proved beyond any doubt that the AMA did 
not speak for all; that many American physicians questioned the continuing 
value of solo, fee-for-service practice and recognized the need to re-struc-
ture health care in this country. In fact, Lape had created the Committee 
of Physicians to be the voice of these dissenters. By publication time, 
Lape's inner group, determined to circumvent the AMA in behalf of im-
proved health services, had drafted a set of deliberately general "Principles 
and Proposals." This document acknowledged the government's responsi-
bility for health and its obligation to subsidize medical education and 
medical research, as well as health care for the medically needy. As Lape 
and her Committee intended, their statement seemed sufficiently general 
and innocuous to attract support from many physicians, yet suggestive 
enough of differences within the profession to persuade the President that 
he might still hope for medical cooperation in health reform.22 
At this time, Eleanor Roosevelt invited Lape's group to luncheon at 
the White House, giving them an opportunity to discuss their ideas with 
the President. Roosevelt, finding their statement a potential foundation for 
action, suggested that they enlist supporters: "Now you want to get a body 
of medical opinion behind that, do you not?"23 Stirred by this executive 
commission, the Committee of Physicians began to circulate their "Prin-
ciples and Proposals" quietly but widely, acquiring the approving signature 
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of one prestigious physician after another. At the same time, the Presi-
dent, his hopes for a health program reawakened by the luncheon-talk, sent 
a copy of the statement to the Interdepartmental Committee for considera-
tion in their work on a national health program.24 
Neither the President nor the Committee of Physicians faltered when 
a pirated copy of the statement, introduced by representatives of the New 
York State Medical Society, met a resounding defeat at the annual meeting 
in Atlantic City in June. Nor did the Committee of Physicians retreat in 
October, when a JAMA editorial attacked the personal integrity of two of 
its members (Hugh Cabot and Robert Osgood) and impugned the intelli-
gence of some signers and the motives of others. Instead, the Committee 
of Physicians protested these slurs in a letter which JAMA declined to 
publish, as it did all statements from the Committee.25 
By autumn 1937 the Committee of Physicians had gathered 430 sig-
natories, including many of America's outstanding physicians and sur-
geons. With exquisite timing to gain maximum public notice, the Com-
mittee released its text and the signers' names to the lay press in time for 
publication on Sunday, November 7th. The story made front-page news in 
major papers across the country. The New York Times called it a "revolt 
within the AMA." The Johns Hopkins medical historian, Henry Sigerist, 
welcomed the "Principals and Proposals" as a "medical declaration of 
independence." To some observers it appeared that the AMA was having 
the same sort of problems with the Committee of Physicians that the more 
conservative parent body, the American Federation of Labor, was having 
with the fledgling CIO.26 
While the AMA was attempting to solve its dissident problem in late 
1937, another major challenge to its authority arose in the District of 
Columbia. Employees of the Federal Home Owners Loan Corporation 
(HOLC) established an experimental consumer cooperative called Group 
Health Association (GHA), designed to give prepaid low-cost care to Bank 
employees and their families, along the lines of the Standard Oil program 
maintained for employees in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Even before open-
ing on November 1, 1937, GHA had to contest charges that its $40,000 
federal starter grant was illegal; that it was an insurance business; and that 
it was a corporation engaged in the practice of medicine. Soon after it 
began to function, physicians on its staff found themselves threatened with 
loss of membership in the District Medical Society and with revocation of 
hospital privileges. Organized medicine's reaction to GHA was doubtless 
exacerbated by the intimation of federal "intrusion" into health care repre-
sented by the starter grant. Because the Home Owners Loan Corporation 
was a constituent agency of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, GHA 
symbolized not only the forbidden combination of prepayment with group 
practice, but also the specter of federal control of medical practice.27 
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Cost of Medical Care Too High, 
Dr. Cabot Says at A. M. A. Trial 
Dr. Cabot Defends Group Medicine 
Prominent Boston physician testified tod ay that it is diffi-
cult for the average person to pay for adequate medical care. 
Until the period immediately after World War I, when Morris 
Fishbein came to power in the AMA, Hugh Cabot (1872-1945) had 
been active in efforts to reform the AMA from within. By the late 
thirties he saw antitrust action as the only way to combat the Associa-
tion^ adamant resistance to change in forms of practice. Newly re-
tired as head of a surgical section at the Mayo Clinic, Cabot was at 
work on his second book on medical economics (The Patient's DU 
lemma: The Quest for Medical Security in America, 1940) when the 
antitrust case opened. A spokesman for Physicians for the Improve-
ment of Medical Care and a strong proponent of prepayment plans 
and group medicine, he soon organized the White Cross prepaid 
medical plan in the Boston area. 
Clipping from an unnamed newspaper, hand-dated February 7, 
1941, reproduced from the Hugh Cabot papers temporarily in the 
author's possession. With permission of his widow, the late Elizabeth 
Cabot McRoberts, and his son, Arthur Tracy Cabot, Jr. 
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Cartoon in the Washington (D. C.) Evening Star 
July 27, 1939 
Early in the trial, the AMA appeared to have won exemption from 
antitrust prosecution when Judge Proctor of the Federal District Court 
ruled that medicine is a profession, not a trade. In its "report" of the 
trial, the AMA reproduced these two cartoons, together with a number 
of editorials supporting Proctor's ruling. Averring that the D.C. 
Medical Society opposed Group Health only out of concern for the 
"close relation between patient and practitioner" and not at all out of 
"greed," the Baltimore Sun of July 27, 1939, criticized Thurman 
Arnold's attempt to apply antitrust law to the professions. By con-
trast, a Washington Evening Star editorial of the same date applauded 
Arnold's plan to appeal the Proctor ruling and expressed the hope of 
seeing "the technical issues of antitrust jurisdiction in the field of 
medical practice finally resolved." 
Reprinted by permission of the American Medical Association, the 
Baltimore Sun, and Washington Post. 
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Cartoon in the Baltimore (Mil.) Suit, July 27, 1939 
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The nation's press gave considerable attention to each successive 
instance of organized medicine's harassment of GHA. In May 1938 the 
Yale Law Journal found broad implications in these obstructive actions: 
The public obviously has a vital interest in assuring a fair 
trial to organizations like the Group Health Association. 
But as long as medical societies can brandish the bludg-
eon of expulsion, free experimentation—long extolled by 
the medical profession itself as the very lifeblood of 
scientific progress—will be throttled.28 
Hugh Cabot, a member of the Committee of Physicians and author of 
The Doctor's Bill, a patient-oriented primer in medical economics pub-
lished in 1935, was particularly outraged at organized medicine's attacks 
on GHA. Former Dean of the Michigan Medical School, a Mayo Clinic 
section head and a strong supporter of group practice, Cabot had declined 
the Directorship of GHA in February 1938; he had turned sixty-five and 
believed the Director "ought to have at least ten years of certain useful-
ness, barring lightning, tornadoes, Indians, and other acts of God." He 
urged GHA staff members to seek redress through civil suits against the 
District Society: a few court decisions awarding damages, he said, would 
"clear the atmosphere a good deal all over the country." On March 21, 
1938, Cabot even suggested to the General Counsel of HOLC that GHA 
might sue the District Medical Society for conspiracy—except that that 
charge was too difficult to prove (or so he then imagined).29 
It was mid-February 1938 when the President's Interdepartmental 
Committee submitted a proposed comprehensive health program to serve as 
a basis for legislation. The IC listed five measures necessary to remedy 
deficiencies in existing health services: first, expansion of public health 
and maternal and child health services; second, expansion of hospital fa-
cilities; third, medical care for the medically needy; and fourth, insurance 
against loss of wages during illness. The fifth and most controversial rec-
ommendation envisioned a General Program of Medical Care to improve 
health services for the entire population and enable risk-sharing in medical 
costs. This proposal suggested possibilities of financing by general or 
special taxation, by specific insurance contributions from potential benefi-
ciaries or by some combination of the two. Eligibility for federal grants-
in-aid to participating states would require health care providers to meet 
certain standards of service.30 
It was not by coincidence that only three days after the Interdepart-
mental Committee transmitted this proposal to the President (and months 
after the Committee of Physicians had asked the right of reply to JAMA's 
editorial impugning their intelligence and integrity), the AM A Board of 
Trustees granted a hearing to seven members of the Committee at Asso-
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ciation headquarters in Chicago. With Hugh Cabot acting as spokesman, 
the Committee presented four demands that revealed their concern for 
freedom of expression within organized medicine: 
that JAMA publish the Committee's reply to the JAMA 
editorial of October 16; 
that JAMA open its pages to reasonable and honest dis-
cussion of social and economic problems of medicine; 
that such discussion be kept "on a plane consonant with 
the dignity of the profession"; 
that the Trustees give a prompt answer so that "we may 
determine our future."31 
Although JAMA editor Morris Fishbein was not an AMA Trustee, he 
was present and active at the meeting. He insisted that JAMA had always 
been "an open forum," and he denied that it had been less than "reason-
able and honest" under his editorship. He said that he could not possibly 
be expected to make room for all the manuscripts submitted to him— 
unless "the American Medical Association wishes to destroy its most 
valuable asset . . . for the notions of every nit wit that comes along." 
Hugh Cabot replied, "I hoped that we should be able to stay on a some-
what higher level Does Dr. Fishbein still believe that the gentlemen who 
signed these Principles and Proposals are thoughtless and incapable of 
thought, as stated in the [JAMA] editorial?"32 
The Trustees were alternately hostile and conciliatory throughout this 
day-long meeting. Verbatim minutes suggest that they had agreed to meet 
with the Committee members largely because they hoped to learn whether 
this rebel band had encouraged presidential hopes for medical cooperation 
in a national health program. Despite repeated urging, Committee mem-
bers steadfastly refused to specify what they might do next if the Trustees 
denied their demands; nor would they promise to clear all future state-
ments with the Association before making them public.33 
In the months following this February meeting, Group Health Associa-
tion continued to encounter opposition from the District of Columbia 
Medical Society. Although similar difficulties had marred and sometimes 
ended the existence of other prepaid groups, the GHA had a different des-
tiny, dictated partly by its geographic location in the District (where 
commerce was subject to Congressional jurisdiction, and hence to antitrust 
law), partly by rampant popular and professional dissatisfaction with or-
ganized medicine in the late Depression. 
At the spring 1938 meeting of the American College of Physicians, 
retiring president James Howard Means, a member of both the AMA and 
the Committee of Physicians, publicly repudiated current medical stand-
patism in a speech which the New York Times reported under the headline 
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ATTORNEY^. GE&EKA&••'• 
In 1940 the United States Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the 
Proctor ruling that medicine is a profession, declaring instead that it 
is a trade, liable to prosecution under the Sherman Act. In its 1941 
"report" of the trial then still in progress, the AMA reproduced this 
miscaptioned photograph of Assistant Attorney General Arnold, to-
gether with the JAMA editorial of March 23, 1940, discussing press 
opinion about the Appeals Court ruling. Directly above Arnold*s 
picture in the AMA compilation is Morris Fishbein's editorial warning 
that an Idaho editorial criticizing the exclusion of osteopaths and 
chiropractors from hospital privileges would, if heeded, break down 
"established order in the field of medicine" and open the hospitals "to 
every half-educated medical pretender and charlatan." 
Reprinted by permission of the American Medical Association. 
138 
"Nation's Doctors Called to Revolt"34 On May 4, addressing the harassed 
members of GHA in Washington, Hugh Cabot stressed both the economic 
and the medical advantages of group practice. He attacked the notion that 
physicians alone should dictate the social and economic conditions of 
health care: "In these fields they are, at best, inexpert and perchance 
prejudicial witnesses. They cannot therefore be relied upon as experts and 
they ought not to aspire to that distinction." The AMA, Cabot observed, 
was beginning to have all the attributes of a political organization, "and 
when we voice our fear of the control of medical practice by politicians 
we ought, I think, to specify which kind of politicians we mean." 
What organized medicine appears to be asking is that it 
shall, as a body, be given control of the changes which 
are to be made, as time goes on, in the methods of 
offering medical care to the American people. This is, of 
course, pure fascism of the Italian type.35 
Although Cabot and GHA officials had distributed advance copies of 
Cabot's full text to the press, it was perhaps inevitable—in the face of 
events in Europe in May 1938—that reporters should have a field day with 
the phrase "pure fascism" applied to the AMA.36 
Cabot returned to work at the Mayo Clinic to find a mound of letters 
asking for copies of his speech. He also returned with a high opinion of 
the health care offered by GHA and with rising anger at the District of 
Columbia Medical Society for refusing consultation with GHA doctors and 
for expelling one of its staff physicians because of his participation in the 
group. On May 23 Cabot wrote to the Department of Justice, describing 
tactics the District Society was using to drive GHA out of business. The 
implications of the case caught the attention of Assistant Attorney General 
Thurman Arnold, a young firebrand whom Roosevelt had recruited from 
the Yale Law School to re-focus long dormant antitrust laws on abuses of 
power which appeared to work against the public interest.37 
Within a day of receiving Cabot's letter, Justice Department officials 
indicated to GHA their willingness to investigate its difficulties with the 
District Medical Society. To build a broad base for a sweeping action, 
Justice asked to hear from anyone who favored group practice and opposed 
the methods which organized medicine was using to obstruct its develop-
ment. Cabot passed this suggestion along to Walter Alvarez and other 
trusted colleagues.38 
Thurman Arnold immediately began issuing press releases about the 
prospective investigation, releases which AMA officials uneasily recog-
nized as being "peculiarly timed" with Association activities. The first 
release appeared just two weeks before the annual Association meeting. It 
announced plans for an inquiry into complaints that the AMA and the 
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District Medical Society had conspired in violation of antitrust laws during 
the course of their opposition to group health plans. Although much of 
the popular press was anti-New Deal at this time, public interest was 
immediate and intense. The AMA promptly sent someone to Washington 
to inquire about the origins of the investigation, but Justice officials would 
say only that the inquiry had begun with an informal complaint from a 
source the Department refused to disclose.39 
At their annual meeting in San Francisco in mid-June, AMA members 
heard Josephine Roche, chair of the Interdepartmental Committee, gently 
command them to present constructive ideas for medical relief at a Na-
tional Health Conference to take place in July. The AMA used the oc-
casion of its San Francisco meeting to deny that it was a monopoly and 
to denounce attempts to treat it as such—thus indicating, as Arnold later 
observed, that the Association had mistaken the charge of illegal restraints 
and coercions for that of illegal monopoly.40 
While ominous sounds continued to emanate from Justice, the Admini-
stration unveiled its five-point health program at the National Health 
Conference. For three hot days in Washington in mid-July 1938, 175 
delegates, representing twenty million Americans in professional, labor, 
farm and consumer groups, publicly voiced complaints about existing 
health care and enthusiasm for the Administration plan.41 
Emerging from the Conference understandably shaken, the AMA asked 
to confer with the administration's Interdepartmental Committee on the 
Sunday following.42 In contrast to the "evolutionary" pace which the 
Association had always demanded in altering the structure of health serv-
ices, it agreed at once to support four of the five recommendations of the 
National Health Program—on the condition that the Interdepartmental 
Committee abandon the General Program of Medical Care. (This last 
provision, the AMA insisted, was unacceptable because it would open the 
door to universal compulsory health insurance.) Despite the AMA's new-
found openness to such previously unacceptable provisions as cash indem-
nity in illness and medical need as a legitimate category in apportioning 
federal-state aid, the Interdepartmental Committee refused to accept the 
AMA's terms.43 
On July 31 Thurman Arnold released a long, discursive announcement, 
widely reprinted in the press, explaining specific illegalities that Justice's 
preliminary investigation had uncovered. In order to obtain the "necessary 
cooperation" and to give the prosecution a "proper setting," Arnold ex-
plained that the offending Medical Society members were not guilty of 
"moral turpitude"; rather, he said, they were like a reckless driver, a 
person of "distinction and good-will who is in a hurry to meet his legiti-
mate engagements." Unhappily for the doctors under investigation, char-
acter did not count in antitrust cases until it was too late; that is, the 
character of the defendants would affect only the type of sentence, not the 
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fact of prosecution. According to Arnold, these introductory observations 
were necessary "to create an atmosphere which leaves the door open to a 
constructive proposal at any stage of the litigation." 
In a second significant passage, Arnold said that the importance of 
medical economics for this suit made it appropriate for him to consider the 
nation's health problem at large. He produced data showing that illness in 
America bore an inverse relation to income; that a number of maternal and 
infant deaths could be prevented by placing medical care within financial 
range of the entire population. Yet he assured readers that the Sherman 
Act was not a method of directing or planning the future: the Justice 
Department was not attempting to solve problems of medical economics, 
but only to insure that monopoly practices were not used to prevent "il-
luminating experiments in this field." Arnold explicitly invited construc-
tive suggestions from the AMA: "In the event that voluntary cooperation 
results in constructive proposals going beyond the elimination of illegal 
practices, the department will adhere to its previously announced policy of 
submitting such proposals to the court as the basis for a consent decree."44 
Within a month the AMA sent another delegation to confer with the 
Interdepartmental Committee. Again the Association agreed to support all 
the rest of the National Health Program, on condition that the government 
drop the General Medical Program. Again the Interdepartmental Commit-
tee refused.45 
At this point Arnold began to line up witnesses to appear before a 
grand jury. Although the AMA had intimidated several of the Justice 
Department's prospects, two of the strongest remained ready to testify: 
Hugh Cabot, just retired from the Mayo Clinic, and Michael Marks Davis, 
then head of the Committee on Research in Medical Economics.46 Arnold 
originally scheduled the grand jury to open on September 19. When the 
AMA called a Special Session of the House of Delegates for Septembei 
16, Arnold in turn notified witnesses that the grand jury would be post 
poned.47 
When the AMA Special Session convened, Trustee Arthur Booth told 
the delegates that they had come together only to register official Associa-
tion views on the National Health Program before Congress met again in 
early 1939. Even the published record of this session, however, suggests 
a high level of preoccupation with impending grand jury action. The 
Association had not yet received any official notice of action by Justice; 
yet investigators had already appeared at AMA headquarters where they 
had "consulted some correspondence." Booth assured the delegates that 
the Association welcomed investigation, for its actions had always been "in 
the interest of the public welfare, and for advancing the standards and 
quality of medical service for the American people."48 
On October 1 the Justice Department made two direct public attacks 
on organized medicine. Addressing the Missouri Bar Association in SL 
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Louis, Thurman Arnold explained that long neglect of the antitrust laws 
had led American physicians to think it their peculiar privilege to enforce 
their views against contract practice by simple and direct forms of boycott 
and coercion—a misconception which the Justice Department was working 
to correct in advance of prosecution. The same day, speaking on 
"Monopoly and Medical Care" before the Woman's Trade Union League 
in New York, one of Arnold's special assistants reiterated that, unless the 
AMA came to Justice with a proposed consent decree, the Department 
would have no alternative to grand jury proceedings.49 
AMA officials did not feel able to compromise further. Cheered on 
by press criticism of "New Deal medical bluff on the part of "zealots" in 
the Justice Department (and by friends like H. L. Mencken, who urged 
Fishbein to defy "these New Deal goons"), the Association stood fast. 
The Justice Department remained equally unyielding.50 
On October 17 a grand jury of twenty-three males (including six 
salesmen, a brewer, a cab driver, a hotel manager, a bank teller and a 
Negro messenger) began hearing testimony from the government's lead 
witness, Hugh Cabot. Although prevented by the secrecy rule from dis-
cussing his actual testimony, Cabot relaxed after his full day on the stand 
by regaling a delighted press corps with his views about group practice, 
prepayment and salaried physicians. True to his reputation as a "schis-
matic" (the late Nathan Sinai called Cabot "the Martin Luther of American 
medicine"), he reminded reporters that he had told the National Health 
Conference in July that medical practice in some parts of the nation was 
"medieval."51 
On October 25, while grand jury proceedings continued in Washing-
ton, Morris Fishbein attempted a jest before an audience of three thousand 
at the annual New York Herald-Tribune Forum: "Members of the jury, I 
do not rise in defense of the American Medical Association as a monop-
oly." Fishbein earnestly contended that group practice costs more than 
private practice for the 85 percent of diseases which he said the ordinary 
doctor could easily handle with his little black bag. Insisting that the 
AMA had never been guilty of a "rigid or standpat attitude," he predicted 
that the AMA would reach agreement with the Interdepartmental Commit-
tee when they met again on October 31.52 
Fishbein was too optimistic. The AMA brought no new concessions, 
and the Interdepartmental Committee again refused to abandon the General 
Program of Medical Care.53 
On November 10 Justice once more explained its policy on consent 
decrees: "the Department will always reject consent decrees which merely 
eliminate unlawful conduct. . . . The only consent decrees which the 
Department is willing to consider during the pendency of a criminal case," 
it explained, "are those containing provisions for affirmative public benefits 
which could not be secured by the criminal proceeding alone."54 
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The AMA and the District of Columbia Medical Society had appar-
ently hoped to meet this requirement on October 6, by publicly announcing 
plans for a "Mutual Health Service," a producers' cooperative which would 
reserve to the Medical Society the right to limit members' incomes and 
benefits.55 Such a plan evidently failed to offer what the Justice Depart-
ment deemed adequate "public benefits," for Arnold's team of lawyers 
now moved into high gear. They served the AMA with a subpoena 
requiring it to produce every Association document back to 1930, pertain-
ing to any of the following experiments in low-cost or prepaid health care: 
Illinois Social Hygiene League; 
Public Health Institute, Chicago; 
United Medical Service, Chicago; 
Civic Medical Center, Chicago; 
Milwaukee Medical Center; 
Trinity Hospital, Little Rock; 
Ross-Loos Medical Group, Los Angeles; 
Community Hospital, Elk City, Oklahoma. 
By pleading that the subpoena constituted an "unreasonable and oppressive 
burden," AMA lawyers managed to have part of it quashed. What re-
mained required the Association to produce all correspondence and other 
documents dating from January 1932, pertaining to relations between the 
AMA, the District Medical Society, and GHA; to any requirement or 
proposal of the AMA that hospital staff members belong to local AMA 
branches; and to instances where hospitals failed to gain approval for 
internship training because they had staff members who were not in good 
standing with the local medical society.56 
From the information which this sweep yielded, Arnold's lawyers 
drafted a tighter subpoena on November 20, requiring the AMA to surren-
der all materials prepared between January 1935 and November 20, 1938, 
"containing statements with respect to any action or policy taken or 
adopted or considered or proposed to be taken or adopted by or on behalf 
of the A.M.A. or of any medical society or association affiliated with the 
A.M.A., or of any hospital, in opposition to group medical practice or to 
the provision of medical care on a periodic prepayment basis."57 
AMA counsel again protested a fishing expedition, this time without 
success. Working with the wealth of evidence produced by the second 
subpoena, Arnold and his staff had no difficulty securing an indictment by 
December 20. Although the St. Louis Globe-Democrat found the indict-
ment "preposterous" and the New York Daily Mirror labelled Arnold's 
tactics "a brutal combination of the Star Chamber and Nazi bureaucracy," 
the press gradually shifted toward the side of the government as the case 
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made its way to the Supreme Court, where it ended in convictions and 
fines in 1943.58 
n 
What were the results of this singular episode in American legal and 
medical history? Both sides, claiming that a fair trial was impossible in 
what each perceived as an atmosphere of adverse publicity, nonetheless 
claimed victory. The AMA's retrospective claim that no one really "won" 
the suit should be weighed in conjunction with the AMA's decision—by 
a standing vote of the House of Delegates—to appeal the Federal District 
Court judgment of guilty, rendered in April 1941. Morris Fishbein was 
probably closer to the truth when he suggested, at the time of the case, 
that it served mainly "to convict the AMA in the eyes of the people as 
being a predatory, antisocial monopoly."59 
It is possible that public doubts about the social integrity of the 
profession, raised by prolonged adverse publicity between 1938 and 1943, 
contributed to the eventual erosion of public trust in medicine's scientific 
integrity as well.60 This erosion appears to have become especially marked 
in the troubled area of cancer research and treatment. Within a decade of 
the Supreme Court decision, a committee of the Senate requested a study 
of cancer research organizations that would concentrate especially on "the 
operation of voluntary cooperative prepaid medical plans" offering cancer 
treatment, and "the resistance, if any, that each insurer has experienced 
from any individuals, organizations, corporations, associations, or com-
bines, in their attempts to offer protection to those who are afflicted with 
the disease cancer."61 
For GHA, the problem of exclusion from hospitals in the District 
began to vanish with the original indictment, even before the case went to 
trial. Daniel Borden, President of the District Medical Society during the 
trial, later recalled that, as a result of the antitrust charge, "there was a rod 
held over the profession" and the AMA changed their "Bible" (the code 
of ethics) to "eliminate any problem relative to the Sherman Act." 
Looking back at the trial thirty years later, Borden thought that it had 
marked "the beginning of what might be termed 'government influence' 
which has gone on . . . to Medicare." Reminiscing in 1959, Warren 
Magee, a lawyer for the defense, and Theodore Wiprud, Executive Director 
and Secretary of the District Medical Society in 1938, recalled that, after 
the trial, the Society had stopped attempting to influence forms of medical 
practice.62 
This last result was what Thurman Arnold had always publicly 
claimed was the purpose of the suit: "There should be free and fair 
competition," he said in 1938, "between newer forms of organization for 
medical service and older types of practice without the use of organized 
coercion on either side. If the newer forms of organization should result 
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in inferior standards of therapy, as is feared by their medical opponents, 
that fact can be revealed only by experiment" In 1944, U.S. Assistant 
Attorney General Wendell Berge (a self-confessed member of "the small 
group of willful men" who instituted the antitrust case) explained that the 
Justice Department saw the case in terms of the centuries-long common 
law tradition which holds that the maintenance of health is "one of the 
great tasks of society." In this view, Berge told the American Urological 
Association, the physician is a social instrument doing work of a "public 
character." Thus, to the Justice Department, the question was not one of 
"private practice versus socialized medicine" ("For practice is never private 
and all medicine has a social function"), but "merely of a fair field and 
no favors between two rival plans for bringing doctors and patients to-
gether." Berge reminded his physician audience that, when Congress 
originally chartered the D.C. Medical Society, it had refused to grant the 
group economic power over its members: Congress intended the Society 
for scientific and educational advantage only, and—explicitly—for 'no 
other purpose' whatever.63 
The Justice Department's victory gave Group Health Association free-
dom to develop at last ("in a wartime economy rather than in a depressed 
one," as its recent historians state), and develop it did. By the end of 
World War II, GHA had more than 8000 members; by 1970, 75,000; by 
1985, 144,000. The court decision also inspired many medical societies to 
form their own prepayment plans, some of them forerunners of the "Blue" 
plans of today. It suggested possible legal safeguards to the founders of 
such experiments as Kaiser Permanente, Group Health Cooperative of 
Puget Sound, Health Insurance Plan of Greater New York—and Boston 
Health Associates, which Hugh Cabot was organizing even as the antitrust 
case moved through the courts. Looking back in 1966, Thurman Arnold 
observed that, without this decision establishing that physicians cannot 
boycott organized medical care of any sort, "the AMA would be in the 
same position with respect to the doctors as Jimmy Hoffa was with respect 
to the teamsters."64 
However effectively the antitrust case cleared the way for what Arnold 
called "illuminating experiments," it had a wholly different effect on na-
tional health planning. Although there is no evidence that Arnold intended 
the case to bring the medical profession under the yoke of civil service, 
as AMA officials implied, the timing of Arnold's actions in the summer 
and fall of 1938 did seem to suggest a connection with Administration 
plans.65 President Roosevelt, moreover, did not seem displeased that 
threats of impending antitrust action on a separate matter appeared to 
influence AMA negotiations on the proposed National Health Program. 
After the Delegates' Special Session of September 1938, when the AMA 
continued to oppose the general program of medical care even in the face 
of subpoenas bound to reveal evidence that was both humiliating and 
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incriminating, Roosevelt apparently sensed their intransigence as an insu-
perable obstacle. Increasingly preoccupied with the war in Europe, he 
drew back from his plan, allowing Senator Wagner of New York to intro-
duce a legislative version in February 1939. At Senate hearings in the 
spring of 1939 liberal labor spokesmen and the Committee of Physicians 
supported the Wagner Bill in principle and offered to help perfect it in 
detail. The AMA House of Delegates unanimously condemned it, and the 
AMA raised dues to meet "certain contingencies that have arisen." Sub-
sequently, the political action arm of the AMA bombarded the public with 
25 million leaflets describing the "excessive cost" and "socialistic" and 
"dictatorial" tendencies of the proposed program. Morris Fishbein again 
displayed his genius at slanting the facts: "A little sickness," he said, "is 
not too great a price to pay for maintaining democracy in times like 
these." In a public statement shortly before Christmas 1939, President 
Roosevelt indicated that he had abandoned the effort for a national health 
program and would settle for the construction of fifty hospitals in the 
neediest parts of the nation.66 
From the perspective of cooperation by organized medicine in reorgan-
izing health services, the antitrust case had a pervasively deleterious effect. 
For years afterward, AMA officials continued to use the trial as a focus 
for re-building physician solidarity which had been sorely weakened by 
economic distress in the drought and depression thirties. Throughout five 
years of litigation, JAMA devoted large chunks of space to the case, 
always characterizing it as Morris Fishbein had done in one of his earliest 
published responses: as a persecution rather than a prosecution.67 Most 
practitioners lived far from Washington and they read no periodicals other 
than JAMA on the politics and economics of medicine. A study by the 
Michigan State Medical Society in 1934 documented JAMA's powerful and 
exclusive hold on its readers: 89 percent of the physicians surveyed read 
JAMA; 70 percent read a state society journal; fewer than 30 percent read 
any other type of literature.68 Week by week, JAMA reminded American 
doctors of the suit, always intimating that the critical issue was the right 
of the state to control the practice of medicine. While many journalists 
applauded the final decision as a step toward free competition in health 
care, there were indications that the AMA had persuaded others to its own 
position. According to the Los Angeles Times, "There is some reason to 
suspect that the suit was genuinely inspired by the desire of New Dealers 
to socialize medicine and regiment it under government control, a desire 
which the AMA has unfalteringly opposed."69 
So powerful did this myth become that surviving defendants (and their 
lawyers) continued to insist many years later that, had the medical organi-
zations chosen to avert a criminal trial by negotiating a consent decree— 
that is, by presenting acceptable plans for low-cost prepaid health care, 
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they would have subordinated the practice of medicine forever to meddle-
some supervision by the judicial arm of government.70 
Thus weighted with a burden it was never intended to carry, the 
antitrust case has left the American public with a mixed legacy. Because 
of it we enjoy increased access to prepaid medical care by groups which 
represent "not only economic devices but also organizational adjustments 
to functional specialism."71 But it has also hardened the medical establish-
ment in its opposition to national health planning, unfairly associated since 
1938 with judicial coercion and criminal prosecution. 
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